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Rorty, Dewey, and Incommensurability1 
 
The purpose of my presentation is to reconsider the relationship between Dewey’s classical 
pragmatism and Rorty’s neo-pragmatism, and to do so from a perspective in which the notion of 
incommensurability is a central component. In what follows I’ll focus mainly on two aspects. In the 
first two parts of my paper I concentrate on the Rorty-Dewey relation: I summarize the main points of 
Rorty’s critique leveled against Dewey, and also the interrelations between the key ideas – among 
them the notion of incommensurability – along which Rorty departs from his intellectual hero; 
afterwards I contrast some consequences of Rorty’s incommensurability thesis with the views of 
Dewey on three themes, namely, the types of communities they consider, the issue of moral progress, 
and their theory of education. Finally, in the closing part I approach the issue of incommensurability 
from a different angle, and try to formulate some critical points regarding Rorty’s Whiggish way of 
appropriating Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability.  
 
 
I. Rorty, Dewey, and the Issue of Incommensurability  
 
If we take a look at the three articles Rorty has explicitly devoted to the discussion of Dewey’s work 
(1982a, 1982b, 1995), we find the following (more extensively: Nyírı 2010). Rorty wholeheartedly 
welcomes Dewey’s approach of using “philosophy as an instrument for social change” (1982b, 74). 
He also welcomes his means to that end, namely, Dewey’s therapeutic approach to traditional 
philosophy, necessitated by the fact that the latter’s dualistic notions reflect social interests of the past, 
and as such, imply pseudo-problems for the present. The only really important critique Rorty levels 
against his intellectual hero is, however, that Dewey has made an explicit attempt at reconstructing 
metaphysics, namely, at constructing a metaphysics of experience and nature. The reason for critique 
according to him is that Dewey’s non-dualistic, ’empirical metaphysics’ goes beyond his therapeutic 
approach of pointing out the cultural genesis of traditional dualisms, and consists basically in the 
rather constructive attempt to find continuities between lower and higher processes – very reminiscent 
of his early project of panpsychism (from the 1880s). What Rorty finds objectionable, then, is not the 
very fact that Dewey tries to dissolve all kinds of metaphysical dualisms. What he rejects is rather the 
manner in which Dewey conceives it to be done, namely, the way along which he tries to merge such 
dualisms – among them that of Nature and Spirit – in the one and perpetual process of ’evolving,’ 
acknowledging differences only in degree, throughout.  
 
Rorty’s decisive passage, which is also very instructive regarding his own project, is the following. If 
it is the notion of a perpetual process of growth and evolving – a kind of panpsychism – which is  
 
„to bridge the gap between experience and nature, we begin to feel that something has gone 
wrong. For notions like »experience,« »consciousness,« and »thought« were originally invoked 
to contrast something that varied independently of nature with nature itself. The philosophically 
interesting sense – the only sense relevant to epistemology – of experience is one that goes back 
to ta phainomena rather than to empeiria, to a realm that might well be »out of touch« with 
nature because it could vary while nature remained the same and remain the same when nature 
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varied. Much of Dewey’s work was a desperate, futile attempt to get rid of the phainomena 
versus ontōs onta, appearance versus true reality, distinction, and to replace it with a distinction 
of degree between less organized and directed and more organized and directed empeiria” 
(Rorty, 1995: 6).  
 
What Rorty misses above all in Dewey’s conception, then, is some way of maintaining a distinction 
between ’phainomena’ and ’empeiria’, that is, some sense of a discontinuity between the realm ’that 
might well be „out of touch” with nature’ or reality, on the one hand, and the realm of nature or reality 
itself, on the other.  
 
Regarding Rorty, two things must be observed here. First, there is in fact a basic distinction in his 
thought that corresponds to the mentioned discontinuity, and thereby entails a departure from 
Deweyan metaphysics, namely, Rorty’s sharp differentiation between the realm of justification and 
that of causation. Second, Rorty is also eager to dissolve metaphysical dualisms, but he manages to do 
so in an utterly non-Deweyan manner, one which is to avoid every kind of metaphysics. The point I’d 
like to make is that these two aspects of Rorty’s thought are not only correlated, but they are also 
intimately connected to a basic notion in his work, borrowed from Thomas Kuhn, namely, that of 
incommensurability. Now, the key for understanding the inferential relation between the idea of 
incommensurability among different sets of beliefs, on the one hand, and the distinction between the 
orders of causation and justification, on the other, is Rorty’s adherence to anti-representationalism.  
 
One can show the interrelatedness of these conceptions along the following three claims. 1) Rorty’s 
distinction between the orders of justification and causation is a necessary one for disclaiming 
represenationalism, that is, for rejecting the idea that our beliefs, claims, discourses, or vocabularies – 
in short, our linguistic practices – should be justified by those instances of the world which they 
supposedly represent. The causation-justification distinction is a pregnant one (see Brandom 2000). In 
any case, it does not correspond to some metaphysical dualism, say, to that of Spirit and Nature – the 
notion that “the universe is made up of two kinds of things” is a “bad old metaphysical notion”, Rorty 
claims (1979: 351). Rather, this distinction gives voice to Rorty’s thesis that although we stand amidst 
causal constrains of the environing world of things, our linguistic descriptions of those things cannot 
be justified by such causal effects. Causal and therefore non-normative constrains cannot justify our 
beliefs – only reasons can do that, due to the normative constrains inherent in them. In other words, 
insofar as the relation between our linguistic practices and the environing things of the world is strictly 
causal, it makes no sense to conceive that relation additionally in terms of representation. As Rorty 
claims, blurring “the distinction between the question What causes our beliefs? and the question What 
justifies our beliefs? […] is essential for any representationalist theory of knowledge” (1995: 5).  
 
2) Now, Rorty’s anti-representationalism exacts him to give non-representational accounts of old 
metaphysical dualisms. And this is exactly what Rorty does, for example in a chapter of the Mirror 
devoted to the Spirit-Nature distinction, where he says: „Nature is whatever is so routine and familiar 
and manageable that we trust our own language implicitly. Spirit is whatever is so unfamiliar and 
unmanageable that we begin to wonder whether our »language« is »adequate« to it” (1979: 352). 
Again, the strategy of re-describing traditional dualisms in terms of familiarity does not amount to 
ascribing various properties to various metaphysical entities. It amounts to making a distinction 
between our linguistic practices in terms of the sufficiency or insufficiency, the pragmatic success or 
failure, of our familiar vocabularies in facing and coping with diverse phenomena.  
 
3) Rorty’s anti-representationalism – and thus, his adherence to the distinction between the order of 
causation and that of justification – goes hand in hand with his incommensurability thesis. For a 
representationalist theory of knowledge simply has no room for a tenable notion of 
incommensurability among different sets of justified beliefs, and in turn, true incommensurability of 
diverse sets of justified beliefs must preclude representationalism. It is so because representationalism 




II. Some Consequences of the Incommensurability Thesis Regarding the Rorty-Dewey Relation   
 
If the argument sketched above holds good, then the notion of incommensurability constitutes one of 
the main points along which Rorty departs from Dewey in a systematic sense. This claim can be 
further strengthened by pointing out several consequences of the incommensurability thesis. Now, the 
fact that the latter plays a central role in Rorty’s overall philosophy is beyond doubt. In the Mirror, the 
idea of incommensurability is introduced in the form of contrasting “conversation” to 
“commensuration” – at the turning point of the book, where at stake is the overcoming of the 
epistemological paradigm of philosophy and culture as a whole. Discourses are „commensurable” 
whenever they are governed by a „set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be 
reached” (Rorty 1979: 316), and they are incommensurable whenever no such set of rules is available 
– one can give no algorithm for choice among them. The distinction between commensurable and 
incommensurable discourses corresponds to that between normal and abnormal discourses, and the 
studies of them are carried out by epistemology, and in turn, by hermeneutics. For „epistemology 
proceeds on the assumption that all contributions to a given discourse are commensurable – Rorty 
writes –, [whereas] hermeneutics is largely a struggle against this assumption” (1979: 316), it is a 
struggle which advocates incommensurability.   
 
Our first observation is that these two types of discoursing correspond to two different types of 
community, one concerned with inquiry, aiming at rational agreement, and the other concerned with 
something which is more elementary, and existentially or pragmatically prior to the otherwise 
desirable interest in inquiry, that is, with peaceful coexistence, and in turn, edification. „Epistemology 
views the participants [of discussion] as united in […] an universitas – a group united by mutual 
interests [and norms, one should add – M. Ny.] in achieving a common end – Rorty writes. 
Hermeneutics views them as united in […] a societas – persons whose paths through life have fallen 
together, united by civility rather than by a common goal, much less by a common ground” (1979: 
318). From this perspective, the greatness of Dewey’s „great community” – developed in The Public 
and Its Problems – resides not so much in an ideal of a cooperative community of inquiring citizens, 
but rather in a kind of pluralist society which is „a community of communities”: a societas of a 
plurality of universitas, wherein neither a „common ground” nor even a mutual interest in arriving at a 
consensus can be taken for granted. (In my view, this development on Rorty’s side seems to 
correspond to the present circumstances more than Dewey’s account.)  
 
One should also observe that the adherence to the notion of incommensurability is primarily of moral 
significance for Rorty. While the Deweyan notions of evolving and growth suggest only continual 
alteration, Rorty wants to maintain the possibility of qualitative identity change, made possible by the 
“hermeneutic” or abnormal forms of conversation. For it is discourse between incommensurable 
stances which can, if at all, edify: “edifying discourse is supposed to be abnormal, to take us out of our 
old selves by the power of strangeness” (Rorty 1979: 360). The difference between the two thinkers on 
this point seems to be, then, the difference between emphasizing change in degree, due to intelligent 
reconstruction of our practices, and in turn, emphasizing the possibility of change of identity, via 
creating or choosing a new “final vocabulary” and thereby a new self. (It is this moral motive of Rorty 
which finds his ally in Gadamer’s notion of hermeneutic experience and Bildung.)   
 
Rorty’s reliance on the incommensurability thesis also leads him to some important differences 
regarding the theory of education, when compared to that of Dewey. In his Democracy and Education, 
Dewey “connects the growth of democracy with the development of the experimental method in the 
sciences, evolutionary ideas in the biological sciences, and the industrial reorganization, and points out 
the change in […] education indicated by these developments” (1985: 3). From these achievements he 
extracts the notions central to his educational philosophy, namely, experimentalism, growth, and 
reconstruction. He says, for example: „Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is all one 
with growing; it has no end beyond itself” (1985: 59). „The idea of education advanced […] is 
formally summed up in the idea of continuous reconstruction of experience […]” (1985: 86). Now, 
compared to Dewey’s perhaps somewhat one-sided emphasis on the continuity of organic interaction, 
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and growth in the sense of intelligent reconstruction of experience – the importance of which is 
nowhere called into doubt by Rorty –, in his educational writings Rorty puts forward the difference 
between two tasks of education which do not stand in such a continuity, but rather, mostly clash with 
one another, namely, socialization and individualization. It should be realized – he warns –, that 
„education is not a continuous process from age 5 to age 22. […] the word ’education’ covers two 
entirely distinct, and equally necessary, processes – socialization and individualization” (1999: 117). 
Although Dewey was obviously well aware of these aspects of education, the very fact that he 
described the process and the end of education in terms of growth, formation of habits, perpetual 
reconstruction, etc., seems already to imply that it is the aspect of socialization, rather than that of 
individualization – in the radical sense, as Rorty has it in view –, that concerned him more.   
 
What all these suggest is that the Rorty–Dewey relation should be reconsidered. For it may well be the 
case that the two philosophers address different levels of the problems, where these levels do not at all 
exclude one another, but rather, the second one emerges beyond, or on the top of the first, and in that 
sense presupposes and includes it. Regarding the relation between epistemology and hermeneutics 
Rorty acknowledges, indeed, that „the two do not compete, but rather help each other out” (1979: 
346). If so, then the possibility of approaching Dewey’s and Rorty’s work as being complementary to, 
rather than exclusive of, one another, should be considered.   
 
 
III. Rorty’s Whiggish Way of Appropriating Kuhn’s Notion of Incommensurability  
 
In this closing part of my presentation I’d like to investigate the manner in which Rorty makes use of 
Kuhn’s idea of incommensurability. For as we saw it, Rorty generalizes the Kuhnian distinction 
between normal and revolutionary sciences of nature and claims that any inquiry or discourse can in 
principle be commensurable or incommensurable. What I’d like to show is, however, that Rorty’s way 
of appropriating Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability is not without peculiar consequences.    
 
As it has been pointed out (Tartaglia 2007: 156), Kuhn’s incommensurability thesis had originally 
been based on an experience of his, namely that of a Gestalt-switch (comparable to the experience of 
the “rabbit-duck” illusion) he went through while studying Aristotelian physics. Such a change of 
vision involves not only “being in different worlds” (in the sense of approaching the things in the 
world from radically different, indeed, incommensurable “conceptual schemes”), but also “seeing 
different things.” In the Mirror, however, Rorty wants to do away with Kuhn’s “idealist-sounding 
claims” (1979: 324), and basically dismisses the Kuhnian notion of Gestalt-switch. He does so by 
refusing Kuhn’s notion of “seeing different things,” and by claiming relevance for a – historically! – 
“neutral language” in describing the things of the world, namely, the “language” of sensory 
stimulation: “the results of looking can always be phrased in terms acceptable to both sides” – Rorty 
claims (1979: 324).  
 
Here our question is whether or not something important is lost in Rorty’s appropriation of Kuhn? For 
it seems to be the case that by the gesture of generalization Rorty also generalizes something which is 
peculiar to the sciences of nature, namely the fact that – at least regarding their success in predicting 
and controlling their subject-matter – their historical progress is undeniable. And again, by that move 
Rorty also seems to eliminate Kuhn’s implicit notion of irreducibly radical „otherness” (involved in 
that of a Gestalt-switch). When Rorty takes it as Kuhn’s claim “that no algorithm was possible save a 
post factum and Whiggish one”, and regrets that such a claim “was, however, obscured by Kuhn’s 
own »idealistic«-sounding addenda” (1979: 324), he takes side with Whiggish enterprises in 
commensuration. But one must be alert to the fact that the possibility of Whiggish narratives arises 
precisely when the notion of a radical „otherness” (rabbit?, duck?) vanishes. From Kuhn’s notion of 
historical incommensurability Rorty draws the conclusion that “objectivity” is always a matter of 
intersubjective justification and agreement. However, to the extent that he defends a Whiggish 
enterprise in historical commensuration, he manages to do away with Kuhn’s sense of historicity.   
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Rorty’s term for giving expression to the overall historicity of ours is that of ethnocentrism 
(sometimes also called by him “anti-anti-ethnocentrism”). By these latter terms he wants to refer to 
both: “ethnocentrism as an inescapable condition – roughly synonymous with »human finitude«”, and 
also „»ethnocentrism« [as] loyalty to the sociopolitical culture of […] »the rich North Atlantic 
democracies«” (1991: 15). The fact that these two senses of ethnocentrism do not coincide with one 
another may have significant consequences regarding the nature of conversation one may conduct – 
and that also concerns the notion of “hermeneutics” Rorty entertains. “We must be hermeneutical 
where we do not understand what is happening but are honest enough to admit it, rather than being 
blatantly »Whiggish« about it,” Rorty writes (1979: 32). Here he speaks about being “blatantly 
Whiggish”, for “being Whiggish” is an inevitable condition of every incommensurable discourse, 
indeed, meaning nothing more than that one is compelled to proceed from his own normal discourse’s 
point of view, that is, one “takes some norm for granted” (1979: 321). A historical account is 
“Whiggish” when it is “constructed […] on the basis of the vocabulary or assumptions of the winning 
side” (1979: 324). In a sense, then, every historiography is inevitably “Whiggish,” insofar as it is 
constructed in the present, written by the alive. And Rorty adds, right away, that although 
hermeneutics is inevitably Whiggish, “insofar as it proceeds nonreductively and in the hope of picking 
up a new angle on things, it can transcend its own Whiggishness” (1979: 320-21). This is correct 
enough, and it must be emphasized that Rorty, for the most part – and at least in his more 
philosophical (and less political) considerations – advocates a kind of openness toward the 
conversational partner. Yet, the question remains, in what degree, and – more exactly – in what sense, 
is historiography and hermeneutics inevitably Whiggish? 
 
The term “Whiggish” also appears in Rorty’s essay titled “The historiography of philosophy: four 
genres” (1998: 50). There he speaks about “conversations between ourselves […] and the mighty 
dead,” and the reason he gives for the need of such an imaginative conversation is that  
 
“we would like to be able to see the history of our race as a long conversational interchange. We 
want to be able to see it that way in order to assure ourselves that there has been rational 
progress in the course of recorded history – that we differ from our ancestors on grounds which 
our ancestors could be led to accept. The need for reassurance on this point is as great as the 
need for self-awareness” [the latter being the result of mere “historical knowledge” which “helps 
us to recognize […] different forms of intellectual life than ours”] (1998: 51).  
 
This kind of “reassurance” is also mirrored in an other description Rorty gives about the term 
“Whiggish”, according to which it “refers to a kind of historiography which tries to show how 
desirable it has been that the party – the standpoint of whom we tend to accept – was in fact victorious 
in the past” (in Rorty’s letter to the Hungarian translator, István M. Fehér). But such a Whiggishness 
doesn’t seem to aim at the above mentioned “transcending its own Whiggishness,” at all. Rather the 
contrary. It aims at an enterprise in commensuration constructed from the point of view of a self-
assured consciousness of superiority. To that extent, we may be justified in making a distinction 
between a weak and a strong senses of Whiggish narratives. In its weak form − i.e. “proceeding from 
norms taken so far for granted, and at the same time being open to putting those norms to test in 
dialogue” − it is a condition of every historically situated conversation, and as such it corresponds to 
the first sense of ethnocentrism which gives voice to “human finitude”. In its strong form, however − 
where Whiggish narratives take the form of an self-assured retrospective account not at all open to 
putting its norms to test −, it may sometimes correspond to the second sense of ethnocentrism, to the 
“loyalty to the sociopolitical culture of […] »the rich North Atlantic democracies«.” The question is, 
to what extent can such a self-assured loyalty be obviously justified? For “»Whiggish« accounts 
[which] draw on our better knowledge” – as Rorty says (1998: 56) – do not seem to suffice when real 
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